How to cite this paper
Renear, Allen H., and Karen M. Wickett. “Documents Cannot Be Edited.” Presented at Balisage: The Markup Conference 2009, Montréal, Canada, August 11 - 14, 2009. In Proceedings of Balisage: The Markup Conference 2009. Balisage Series on Markup Technologies, vol. 3 (2009). https://doi.org/10.4242/BalisageVol3.Renear01.
Balisage: The Markup Conference 2009
August 11 - 14, 2009
Balisage Paper: Documents Cannot Be Edited
Allen H. Renear
Associate Dean for Research and Associate Professor
Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
Allen H. Renear is the Associate Dean for Research and an Associate Professor
at the Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Karen M. Wickett
Doctoral Student
Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
Karen M. Wickett is a doctoral student at the Graduate School of Library and
Information Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Copyright © 2009 Allen H. Renear and Karen M. Wickett. Used by permission.
Abstract
Most definitions of document current in the
document processing and digital publishing communities, would, if take literally,
imply that documents are extensional entities that cannot undergo changes such as
editing or revision. In other domains as well, such as textual criticism and library
science, one can also find notions of text or document that are similarly difficult
to reconcile with modification. We describe the problem and sketch some possible
resolutions. Although the issues are conceptual and foundational the practical
significance is real. Formal representation in logic-based ontology languages,
increasingly important in information management, requires that familiar idioms,
however serviceable and entrenched, be converted to expressions that support literal
interpretation.
Table of Contents
- The Problem
- A Simple Example: The Verona Sentence
- An Inconsistent Triad
- Responses
-
- Responses that Deny Documents are Strings
- Responses that Deny Documents can be Modified
- A Strategy that both Redefines Document and
Denies Modification.
- Concluding Remarks
The Problem
Document modification seems to be routine and widespread. Editing is a familiar
practice to almost everyone, and revision a fundamental feature of publishing workflows.
Yet document modification would appear to be an illusion. Common accounts of what
documents are seem to imply that documents cannot undergo genuine modification.
The W3C XML specification defines an XML Document as a string that meets certain
formal constraints. Strings are mathematical constructs that are defined, ultimately,
in
set theoretic terms. They are therefore purely extensional entities constrained by
the
axiom of extensionality, common to all standard set theories. As a consequence, strings
have all of their non-relational properties essentially and cannot be altered or
modified in any way. Although we can of course identify functions that map one string
to
another, the existence of such functions does not, by itself, provide a explanation
of
what constitutes the modification of a document.
This consequence is not unique to the definition of a document as a string. Familiar
alternative definitions fare no better. Documents (in the relevant sense) have been
defined as graphs, relations, Ordered Hierarchies of Content Objects [derose90], and sentences in formal logic [renear06].
But these are all also extensional entities: graphs, relations, tuples, and strings
all
have mathematical definitions in virtue of which they are kinds of sets. Nor is the
problem particular to formal definitions that make explicit use of mathematical
constructs. Many of the concepts of document (or text) used in library science, textual
criticism, aesthetics, and other fields appear, upon examination, to be similarly
problematic.
A Simple Example: The Verona Sentence
The problem can be made introduced with a simple example that makes no explicit use
of
mathematical or philosophical notions [renear08].
Consider the sentence "I remember Verona." Let this be the first sentence of the first
chapter of a draft of a novel.
Suppose that the author decides to edit that sentence and revises it to read: "I
remember, but dimly, Verona".
It is natural to say that the first sentence of the chapter has been changed, that
it
is now longer. But exactly what has been changed?
What has become longer? The new first sentence, "I
remember, but dimly, Verona", has not changed. That sentence has never consisted of
fewer than five words. The original sentence, "I remember Verona", has not changed
either. It is not now longer than it was; it still consists of three words. It is
true
that "I remember, but dimly, Verona" is a longer sentence than "I remember Verona",
but
it did not become a longer sentence than "I remember
Verona" -- it has always been a longer sentence than "I remember Verona".
One might attempt to address the problem by shifting the scope of attention and
propose that it is the text of the chapter that has changed. However, the chapter
as a
whole is simply another, if longer, textual entity, and has the same identity
conditions. So the puzzle will arise again. The chapter has been revised, but neither
the new text nor the original text undergoes any change during this process. And the
same argument may be made for the entire text of the novel.
In short: While it is natural to speak of sentences or other textual entities changing
when they are edited or revised, it appears that these entities themselves do not
really
change. So what does change?
The Verona puzzle may feel like a parlor trick, but the significance is real enough:
we do not have a clear conceptual understanding of what is happening when documents
are
modified. Of course truth values can be correctly assigned to modification sentences
such as "The sentence was changed", but only if we treat these sentences as idioms,
as
we do sentences like "The average plumber has 3.2 children". Such sentences do not
have
compositional semantics or support existential instantiation and there is often little
systematic guidance for their interpretation. Up until now we have largely avoided
these
problems, relying ad hoc solutions and human intervention. But the increasingly formal
nature of new semantic approaches to information management and publishing, and the
continuing minimization of human intervention, will inevitably require us to more
systematically to develop robust literal interpretations of fundamental concepts.
An Inconsistent Triad
Consider the following three assertions:
-
All documents are strings.
-
Strings cannot be modified.
-
Documents can be modified.
As any two of these assertions will together logically imply the negation of the
remaining assertion it is not possible for all three to be true. And yet each has
some
initial plausibility.
In favor of the first assertion, that all documents are strings, we begin by observing
that in the definition of an XML Document in the W3C XML specification the first clause
has as a consequence that XML Documents are strings:
Definition: A textual object is a well-formed XML document if:
-
Taken as a whole, it matches the production labeled document.
-
It meets all the well-formedness constraints given in this
specification.
-
Each of the parsed entities which is referenced directly or indirectly
within the document is well-formed.
Understanding documents (or a relevant sense of "text") to be sequences of characters
or words is also consistent with approaches in library cataloguing [frbr98] and textual editing [tanselle89].
In favor of the second assertion it may be argued that modification of an entity
necessarily involves the loss of a property and that strings have no properties which
it
is possible for them to lose and survive the loss. [We assume losing a property and
gaining the complement of that property are equivalent characterizations of the same
event.] The string "13571" has the property of having a length of five tokens, the
property of having one token type occur twice, and the property of having the substring
"35". But these are all properties that "13571" cannot lose. That is, the string in
question, "13571", which has property of having "35" as a substring, cannot at some
point in the future lose the property of having "35" as a substring. There is no
plausible entity that will serve as the reidentifiable persistent object that could
undergo such a change. Cf. the Functional Requirements for
Bibliographic Records: "...if a text is revised or modified, the
resulting expression is considered to be a new expression, no matter how minor the
modification may be" [frbr98]
In favor of the third assertion, that documents can be modified, we simply observe
that this is an assumption that for most of us is so deeply entrenched in our common
understanding that the title of this paper probably seems more senseless than
provocative.
Responses
One sort of response to a triad claimed to be inconsistent is to deny the
inconsistency. Typically this takes the specific form of claiming that one of the
assertions in the triad has two possible interpretations. Interpreted one way the
assertion is true but the triad consistent. When the assertion is interpreted in the
other way the triad becomes inconsistent, but the assertion is no longer plausible.
When
this is the situation the problematic nature of the triad is an illusion created by
trading on this ambiguity.
As modal locutions well-known for generating ambiguity and paradox are evident in
our
triad we shall now indicate exactly how the English sentences are to be interpreted
and
confirm that given the intended interpretation the triad is in fact inconsistent.
We do
this by expressing the assertions in elementary predicate logic.
-
(x)[(isaDocument(x) -> isaString(x)]
-
(x)[(isaString(x) -> ~isModifiable(x)]
-
(Ex)[(isaDocument(x) & isModifiable(x)]
On the standard interpretation of quantifiers and connectives these three formulas
clearly form an inconsistent set.
Once the inconsistency of a triad is granted the remaining responses are typically
classified according to which assertion in the triad is rejected. We will consider
responses that reject the first and third assertion; we do not here consider responses
that deny the second assertion.
Responses that Deny Documents are Strings
These responses reject the standard definitions of a document as a kind of string
or relevantly similar entity, such as graph, relation or OHCO. For this to be a
plausible response a suitable alternative definition must be proposed.
The Materialist Strategy: This strategy holds
that a document is not a string, but a concrete arrangement of a quantity of matter
and energy. On this view modification of a document does literally occur:
modification consists in physical changes to the material document, with the
document preserving its identity across these changes (otherwise it would be
destroyed rather than modified).
Against the Materialist Strategy: The identification of a document with a
particular concrete arrangement of matter and energy instead of a string appears
inconsistent with many of the things that we say about documents. For instance we
speak of the document even when there may be many
physical instances, intending not to refer to any one of them, or the set, but
rather to something they all represent or instantiate. Whether this apparent
reference to an abstract object can be paraphrased away remains promissory.
Documents certainly have physical representations, and these representations are
often materially involved in scenarios of putative document modification. But
whether a document can be defined as one of, or even the class of, these separate
individual representations remains to be seen.
The Social Object Strategy: This response posits
as the modifiable document a social object which is
constituted by (but not identified with), one
string at one time and another string at another time, the changes being determined
by social (including institutional and linguistic) circumstances. This approach
abstracts from the physical and is consistent with the common belief that documents
can be modified. The document presumably maintains a coherent identity across
various textual changes and may be associated as well with any number of different
physical representations. A theoretical basis for this strategy can be found John
Searle's work [searle95] although Searle's theory appears to be
primarily one of natural facts that in certain social circumstances "count as"
social facts rather than natural objects that that in certain social circumstances
count as social objects. Barry Smith has defended a theory of social objects that
allows social objects to exist even without natural objects that "count as" or
constitute them [smith03]. Another related perspective is Brian
Cantwell Smith's notion of holding objects in the "middle distance" [cantwellsmith96]
Against the social object strategy: The social object strategy preserves the
intuition that documents are modifiable, but at a considerable cost. First, it
requires an ontologically challenging entity, social objects that cannot be
identified with physical objects, abstract objects, or even mental states. There is
also a corresponding new distinctive metaphysical relation as well: constitution, the relationship that obtains between the
social object and the different strings that constitute that object at different
times. That this relation cannot be simple identity is evident from the fact that
it
is not transitive: while the document qua social object may be constituted by one
string at one time and a different string at another time, this does not imply that
the two strings are themselves identical. Searle's notion of "counting as", if
applied to social objects, may avoid some of the traditional problems with
constitution, but it will still be hard to reconcile social objects with a
naturalistic view of the world.
Responses that Deny Documents can be Modified
These strategies accept the first assertion of the triad, that a documents is a
string, and rejects the third assertion, that documents can be modified. If such an
approach is to be plausible it must provide a convincing alternative account of what
is happening in the situations which we would ordinarily describe as "modifying a
document".
The title of this paper notwithstanding, denying document modification does not
necessarily require claiming that sentences like "John edited a document" never
express facts about the world. These sentences may be considered idioms. As such
they sometimes communicate true assertions, but they are notliterally true. Consider again the sentence "The average plumber has
3.2 children". This sentence might indeed be used to make a true assertion. And if
it does make a true assertion then it is certainly reasonable to say that the
sentence is a true sentence. However we would not conclude from the truth of the
sentence "The average plumber has 3.2 children" that there is therefore an entity
in
the world which is the average plumber and which
actually has some fractional number of children, as
a naive Russellian interpretation of the definite description would entail. What is
being denied in the rejection of the third assertion of the triad is not the truth
of sentences like "John edited a document", but rather that such sentences imply a
claim such as the one suggested by the first order formula:
The New Document Strategy: This response
maintains that the modification of a document is actually the creation of a new
document.
Against the New Document Strategy: The new document strategy has new strings
created with each document modification. This seems peculiar, contrary to general
notion of strings, and generally difficult to reconcile with a naturalistic view of
the world. Consider the string "13571". Was that string created? How did that
happen? And when? Can it be destroyed? Can it be re-created? Unless strings are
material objects the conceptual apparatus of creation and destruction seems entirely
metaphorical.
The Selection Strategy: This approach holds that
in a typical scenario of alleged modification a new but already existing string is
selected for attention. When we say that a
document has been modified we mean that a different string has been selected for the
purpose at hand by some particular person or persons. The physical infrastructure
of
analog or digital document development and publishing, in combination with social
conventions and practices, is a system for recording and communicating which string
is currently distinguished in this way.
Against the Selection Strategy: The selection strategy identifies documents with
already existing strings. But this seems strange. Either these already existing
strings came into existence at some point in the past or they have always existed.
If the former then this strategy has no advantages over the new document strategy;
it must still somehow account for how strings can come into existence, from what
materials and in what causal circumstances. But if the latter, if strings have
always existed, then assuming only that the further requirements for being a
document are non-contingent (such as matching a production) we will have documents,
and not just strings, existing eternally -- apparently even before cognitive agents.
This seems peculiar.
A Strategy that both Redefines Document and
Denies Modification.
Strictly speaking the strategy we are about to take up denies only the third
assertion of the triad (documents can be modified). However because it proposes a
substantially new definition of document it has much in common with strategies that
deny the first assertion and so we are placing it in a separate category.
The String-in-a-role Strategy: This strategy
holds that a document is a string in a particular communicative role. The string
itself may be an uncreated and pre-existing entity, but the strings which are
documents need not always have been documents. Being a document is a property that
strings have only in particular contingent social/linguistic situations. So on this
account documents have not always existed, even
though documents are strings, and strings have always existed. This is because while
a string which is a document has always existed, that string has not always been a
document -- a string becomes a document only in the appropriate social
circumstances.
Although this strategy, like the strategies that reject the first assertion of the
triad (documents are strings) involves a new approach to the definition of document,
it affirms rather than rejects the first assertion of the triad. After all, if a
document is a string in a communicative role, then a document is a string. However,
the string-in-a-role definition of document is unlike definitions such as the one
in
the XML specification in that it places a contingent rather than necessary
constraint on strings satisfying the definition. If a document is defined as a
string with certain purely formal constraints (as it is in the XML specification,
where it must match a particular production in a grammar), then the things which are
in fact documents are documents necessarily. This is because not only is it
impossible for a string to cease to be a string or have been anything other than a
string, it is also impossible for a string that matches a particular production to
have ever failed to match that production or to fail to match that production in the
future.
According to the string-in-a-role strategy the property of being a document is
what Guarino and Welty refer to as a "rigid" property [guarino00].
Guarino and Welty define rigidity using modal logic and model theory, but the basic
idea is simple: a property is rigid if and only if nothing that has that property
could have failed to have that property, or could come to lose that property, (and
still exist). For example, being a person is rigid
because the things that are persons could not have been anything but persons and
cannot cease to be persons (although they can cease to be). But being a student is not rigid because the things that are
students (i.e. persons) might not have been students and can cease to be students
(without ceasing to be). According to Guarino and Welty rigid properties indicate
types, fundamental kinds of things, while
non-rigid properties indicate roles that things of
some particular type may enter into. On this view a document is not a type of thing,
but a role that things of some type or other have in particular contingent circumstances.
The redefinition of document as a "string-in-a-role" is not itself a response to
the inconsistency of the triad; if a document is a string-in-a-role then it is still
a string, and strings cannot change. The string-in-a-role strategy rejects the third
assertion, and denies that, strictly speaking, documents change.
Concluding Remarks
There is much more to be said pro and con on the strategies we have described here,
and there possibly better strategies to consider. We have intended only to suggest
some
of the possibilities. Formal representation and inferencing is increasingly widespread
and increasingly important, and systematically making information computationally
available in logic-based ontology languages requires literal interpretation. Human
beings may effectively communicate with natural language sentences such as "The document
was edited" or "The average plumber has 3.2 children". But to support inferencing
in the
semantic web environment these idioms must be represented formally in languages that
rely on compositional semantics, existential instantiation, and valid deductive
consequences.
Or... perhaps not.
One has to wonder whether all this logic-chopping subtlety is going to be worth it.
It
isn't clear exactly how to finish the job, and yet it is clear that some of our most
familiar -- and effective -- ways of conceptualizing our domain will revised if we
continue along this path. Particularly troublesome is the prospect that the revisions
anticipated will add not only complexity in design and use, but increase computational
complexity as well. As we have suggested elsewhere "denormalized" ontologies may be
more
appropriate for much of the practical work ahead.
Acknowledgements: This paper draws on work carried out collaboratively at the Graduate
School of Library and Information Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Much of the early work was organized by Dave Dubin and sustained by various research
groups.
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E., Renear, A. H. "What is text really?" Journal of Computing in
Higher Education 1 (1990), 3-26. Reprinted in ACM/SIGDOC Journal of Computer Documentation 21 (1997). doi:https://doi.org/10.1145/264842.264843
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ontology of properties. In Proceedings of the 12th European
Workshop on Knowledge Acquisition, Modeling and Management. Lecture Notes
In Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, (2000), 97-112.
×International Federation of Library
Associations (IFLA). Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records: Final Report.
UBCIM Publications-New Series. Vol. 19, München: K.G.Saur, 1998.
×Renear, A. and Dubin, D. "Towards
Identity Conditions for Digital Documents". In Proceedings of the
2003 international Conference on Dublin Core and Metadata Applications
(Seattle, Washington, September, 2003). International Conference on Dublin Core and
Metadata Applications. Dublin Core Metadata Initiative, 1-9. 2003.
×Renear, Allen H. "Is An XML document a
FRBR Manifestation or a FRBR Expression? -- Both, Because FRBR Entities are not Types,
but Roles." in Extreme Markup Languages 2006 Proceedings, Montreal, Canada. 2006.
×Renear, A. H., Dubin, D. "Three of the
Four FRBR Group 1 Entity Types are Roles not Types." In Proceedings 70th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Information Science and
Technology (Milwaukee, WI, October 2007).
×Renear, A. H., Dubin, D., and Wickett,
K. M. "When Digital Objects Change * Exactly What Changes?" In Proceedings 71st Annual Meeting of the American Society for Information Science and
Technology (Columbus, OH, October 2008).
×Searle, J. R. The
Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press, 1995.
× Smith, B. "John Searle: From Speech Acts
to Social Reality", in John Searle,
B. Smith (ed) Cambridge University Press 2003.
× Tanselle, T. G. A Rationale of Textual Criticism, Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1989